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join a union which was designed to bring these things about in the
field of international copyright protection.
At the present time, an extensive study of international copyright
problems is being made by UNESCO's copyright division, an organ
created by the United Nations. A conference was held in Paris in
October, 1949, at which time questionnaires were sent out to all
countries of the world requesting information on present problems
and possible solutions thereto in the international protection of
copyright.43 The replies to these questions are to be studied by a
Committee of Experts which will meet in the fall of 1950 and recom-
mend further steps to be taken on the basis of the government's re-
plies."
The past record and future plans of this organization should be
a note of encouragement to those who desire to see the law of inter-
national copyright improved.
SEGREGATION IN SCHOOLS OF HIGHER LEARNING
This note is confined principally to those controversies which come
about in state controlled schools of higher or graduate learning and
does not purport to deal with all problems arising out of segregation
of races in all public educational institutions.
There are four problems facing a state which seeks to maintain
segregation in schools of higher learning. (1) To what extent does
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the
power of a State to distinguish between students of different races
in professional and graduate education in a State University,1 (2)
What constitutes "equal facilities" in such schools, (3) What treat-
ment must be afforded a Negro attending a school with white stu-
dents, (4) Does a colored person have an absolute right to attend a
school which was established for the exclusive use of white students?
(1) In 1938 the United States Supreme Court had the first of
these issues squarely before it.2 The curators of the State University
of Missouri had refused the petitioner, a Negro, admission to the
University of Missouri School of Law solely because of his race.
As an alternative to admission, the state had given authority to the
43. UNESCO's COPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 16 (1949).
44. Ibid, at p. 20.
1. Such was the issue as stated by Justice Vinson in the recent case of Sweatt
v. Painter, 94 L. Ed. 783 (1950).
2. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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curators to arrange for attendance in schools in any adjacent State
to pursue any studies not offered at Lincoln University, the Negro
school.3 In an opinion delivered by Justice Hughes it was stated
that such action by the curators must be regarded as action by the
State of Missouri. After determining this, it was further held that
a state which did not maintain a law school for Negroes and which
excluded Negroes from a State maintained school can be said to
have discriminated against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though it provides for tuition to schools outside
the state.
In 1948 the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider this
question.4 In this case the applicant had been denied admission to
the School of Law of Oklahoma University solely because she was
a Negress. In a Per Curiam opinion it was said:
"The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded
by a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her al-
though during the same period many white applicants have been
afforded legal education by the state. The state must provide
it for her in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does
for applicants of any other group."'5
The problem was raised again before the Supreme Court in June,
1950.6 The State of Texas had established a separate law school
for Negroes but the petitioner had refused to enter it claiming the
facilities were unequal to those afforded white students in Texas.
The Supreme Court, relying heavily on the Gaines and Sipuel cases
after first determining as a matter of fact that the facilities offered
to the petitioner were not equal to those offered white students said
that the petitioner may claim his full constitutional right which was
legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of
other races. Since such education was not available to him in a
separate law school he was allowed to enter the white school.
In the above cases the court has rejected the contention that the
limited demand for legal education among Negroes relieves the
state from establishing a law school for Negroes, 7 and the court has
also said it is not necessary first to bring an action to have a law
3. The tuition was to be paid until Lincoln University could establish the
School of Law for Negroes. However it was in the curators' discretion as to
when this was to be done.
4. Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
5. For a criticism of this case see 10 GA. BAR J., 346.
6. See note 1, supra.
7. See note 2, supra.
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school established for members of the colored race before seeking
admission in the school reserved for whites.8
Therefore, in answering the first question posed, it must be con-
cluded that the state must provide legal education within the state as
equally to one race as it does for any other. Should a Negro be re-
fused admission to a school operated solely for whites, he may
claim his constitutional right to equal educational facilities and either
force the state to establish such a school or compel them to admit
him to the white school.
The reasoning and results of the foregoing cases are neither shock-
ing nor are such holdings unexpected. Not only in the field of edu-
cation have the federal courts said that the Negro must be provided
equal facilities or equal privileges, but also it has been held that
interstate carriers are bound to provide for colored passengers, hold-
ing first class tickets, accommodations precisely equal in all respects
to those provided for white passengers holding similar tickets.9 The
denial to colored citizens of the right and privilege of being em-
paneled as jurors because of their color, though qualified in all other
respects, is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 Other civil
rights intended to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are the
rights to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property. Thus, it is
observed that a state statute or local ordinance imposing restrictions
based on color or race, on the right to acquire or occupy property
violates the Equal Protection Clause.11 The right of Negroes to vote
has also been established beyond doubt. 
2
It can no longer be doubted that the Negro is entitled to equal pro-
tection of the law and to equal facilities provided for other citizens
of the state, BUT
WHAT ARE EQUAL FACILITIES?
(2) It has been said that while the state is under no compulsion
to establish any public schools, yet if such schools are once estab-
8. See note 4, supra.
9. Gray v. Cincinnati Sou. Ry. Co., 11 Fed. 683 (1882); Murphy v. Western
& A. R. R., 23 Fed. 637 (1885); Rouck v. Sou. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. 226
(1888).
10. See Strander v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). This dicision is fol-
lowed in many other later cases.
11. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
12. See Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943); Elmore v. Rice, 72 Fed.
Supp. 516, aff'd 165 Fed. 2d 387 (1947). It must be remembered that the Con-
stitution does not give the right to vote but only prevents the state from deny-
ing the person the right to vote because of "race, color or previous condition of
servitude".
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lished, the rights of whites and Negroes alike are measured by the test
of equality in privileges and opportunities. 13
The size of the school building has been held to be of little con-
sequence. Yet, it has been held that the constitutional provision had
been violated where the value of the colored school was one-ninth
that of the white school, even though it accommodated one-third more
students. From these cases14 it seems that equal facilities are pro-
vided if there is a reasonable proportion between the size of the
white and colored school in relation to the number of students to be
provided for.
Other cases have held the length of terms, number and qualifica-
tion of teachers, and the course of study available are factors which
must be considered in determining if equal facilities have been pro-
vided. 15
The opinion of the courts has been that remoteness or inaccessi-
bility of colored schools has not alone constituted discrimination.
16
However, it has been held that, where the colored school was located
in a dangerous vicinity and students were imperiled by having to
cross railway tracks and had to endure other hardships to go to and
from school, there had not been equal facilities provided by the state.
17
In the recent Sweatt case, in determining whether or not equal fa-
cilities had been provided for the petitioner, the court considered
equality in the size of the faculty, variety of courses, opportunity
for specialization, size of the student body, scope of library, availa-
bility of law review, and similar activities. What was more impor-
tant (the Court said) was that the law school provided for the white
students possessed to a greater degree those qualities which made
for greater law schools, to wit, reputation of faculty, experience of
administration, position and influence of alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige. Moreover, it was said that should
the petitioner be denied admission he would be excluded from a sub-
stantial segment of society with which he would be working in later
years and would thus be deprived of equal facilities.
The Court has thus stated the tests to be met in providing sub-
stantially equal facilities and determined that not only must the phy-
13. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
14. Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903) ; Lowery
v. School Trustees, 140 N.C. 33, 52 S.E. 267 (1905) ; Jones v. Board of Educa-
tion, 90 Okla. 233, 216 Pac. 896 (1923). All these cases dealt with lower
grade, public schools.
15. See 103 A.L.R. 713 for a collection of cases on these points.
16. Lehew v. Burmell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1890); Lewis v. Board of
Education, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 129, (1876) ; Wright v. Board of education, 129
Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (1930).
17. Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908).
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sical make up or plant be equal, but that all the intangible qualities
connected with a graduate school must likewise be equal.
Even with the limitation that there be substantial equality it is
difficult to see how a state may establish separate schools for Negroes
and maintain the standards of equality as promulgated by the doc-
trine in the Sweatt case. Theoretically it may sound as if it could
be reached, but actually it is impossible. Traditions and prestige
are time-honored and are a product of age. The reputation of a
faculty is not measured so much by the caliber of the present pro-
fessors but by their position of years past. If a student of the law
must associate, while in school, with those persons with whom he will
come in contact later in life, he could only do it within the same
school. It is true that the Supreme Court has now said what consti-
tutes equal facilities, but in the opinion of the writer the test laid
down in the Sweatt case can never be satisfied and that there can
never be even substantial equal facilities in two separate schools. It
must be remembered, however, that the Supreme Court has never
held "equality of facilities" to mean "identity of facilities".
Assuming then, that such conditions cannot be met and a Negro
compels the state to admit him to a school exclusively reserved there-
tofore for the use of white students, the state is then faced with the
third problem.
WHAT TREATMENT MUST THE STATE AFFORD A COL-
ORED PERSON ATTENDING A WHITE SCHOOL?
(3) In the recent McLaurin case 18 the Supreme Court answered
this question. In this case the statutes of Oklahoma had been amend-
ed to allow Negroes to attend graduate schools with white students
on a "segregated basis" in certain instances. McLaurin's admission
was made subject to such rules and regulations, as to segregation,
as the President of the University considered necessary in order
to afford him substantially equal educational opportunities as the other
students.
McLaurin was compelled to sit apart from other students, both in
classes and in the library, to eat at a different time, etc. The Su-
preme Court in deciding the case said that this action by the school
which produced inequalities was state action which denied petitioner
the right to equal education. Although the Court could not pre-
vent any individual student or a group of students from ostracising
or discriminating against McLaurin, the Court removed the restric-
18. McLaurin v. University of Oklahoma, 94 L. Ed. 787 (1950). This de-
cision was handed down on the same date as the Sweatt case.
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tions imposed by the State of Oklahoma and hence allowed him the
opportunity to commingle with the white students and secure their
acceptance on his own merits.
Thus, it may be concluded that once a Negro is admitted to a
white school the state cannot set up rules which would deprive him
of the opportunity to mingle with. other students and to share equal-
ly the facilities of the school at the same time and place.
(4) The last and by far the most serious question squarely pre-
sents the issue of segregation. In all of the foregoing cases our
Supreme Court has artfully avoided meeting this issue. This issue
was made the basis of the arguments in the Sweatt case but the
Court refused to pass on the question saying they would adhere to
the policy of only deciding on those issues necessary to the deter-
mination of the case before it.19 It is doubtful, in the opinion of
the writer, if the Court would ever pass on the constitutionality of seg-
gregation so long as they are able to decide all such cases on the basis
of whether or not equal facilities have been provided. By apply-
ing the tests of the Sweatt case, the Court could easily enforce non-
segregation without specifically saying so.
Assuming that a Negro petitioned for admission to a white law
school and admission was denied, and the state court found as a
matter of fact that the facilities offered to the petitioner were equal
to those in the white school. If there was no appeal from this find-
ing of fact but the Negro does appeal asserting that as a matter
of law he has a right to enter the white school the Supreme Court
would have the issue squarely before it and might well result in an
opinion on this vital question.
It must be remembered that the Constitution neither prohibits
nor sanctions segregation. The cases which the Supreme Court has
decided on this point hold that segregation as such is not prohibited
so long as equal facilities are provided. The first of these cases
was decided in 1896.20 Here it was held that a state statute which
provided for separate railway coaches for white and colored pas-
sengers and the assignment of passengers to their respective coaches
did not deprive a colored passenger of any rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment. This same result was reached in 191421 when
the Court followed the Plessy case holding that it was not an infrac-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to require separate
but equal accommodations for the two races. The question of
whether a Chinese citizen is denied equal protection when he is
19. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
20. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. McCabe v. Atkinson T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
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classed among colored races and is denied the right to enter the
white school was presented to the Court in 1927.22 It was decided
here again that such was not an infringement of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the facilities offered were equal to those of the
white students. In 1950 the Supreme Court held that a railroad
engaged in Interstate Commerce could not subject any particular
person to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage whatso-
ever.28  This case concerned the fact that the railway had provided
in the diner, only one table for the use of Negroes. Here again
the Court did not decide that segregation in itself should be pro-
hibited but only that such service as was rendered by the railway
did not constitute equal facilities. It was said in this case that
where a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling
them to use it, each passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in
accordance uth reasonable regulations. The regulations being im-
posed in this case were found to deny the Negro of the right to
share the facilities equally.
Only the future can reveal if the states will be able to meet the
standards of equality as laid down by the Supreme Court, and at the
same time continue to follow the dictates of public policy in main-
taining separate schools for the two races. The Florida Supreme
Court has recently upheld the validity of a state plan to meet this
goal.
24
In an unanimous decision, the court upheld a plan of the state
board of control to enroll all Negro students at the Florida A. and M.
College for Negroes and give those desiring courses not offered at
the Negro school temporary instruction at the white institutions.
In his decision Justice Sebring stated the present policy of send-
ing Negroes at state expense to out-of-state schools for courses not
offered at A. and M. does not provide equal opportunities as required
by the federal constitution. He further said the plan to provide
temporary instruction at the white institutions until 'adequate and
comparable facilities' are offered at the Negro institution meets all
requirements of the federal law.2 5
WALTIE B. VEHAUN.
22. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
23. Henderson v. U.S.A., 94 L. Ed. 790 (1950).
24. Decided by Florida Supreme Court August 1, 1950.
25. However, in the latter part of July, 1950 the Board of Visitors, of the
University of Virginia refused admission to its law graduate school to an ap-
plicant, solely because he was a Negro, basing such action on the fact that the
Constitution of Virginia prohibited his attendance in such a school.
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